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This paper  evaluates  a UK  policy  that  aimed  to improve  dietary  information  provision  by
introducing  nutrition  labelling  on  retailers’  store-brand  products.  Exploiting  the  differen-
tial timing  of  the  introduction  of  Front-of-Pack  nutrition  labels  as a quasi-experiment,  our





brand  foods,  and an improvement  in their  nutritional  composition.  More  specifically,  we
find that  households  reduced  the  total  monthly  calories  from  labelled  store-brand  foods  by
588  kcal,  saturated  fats by  14 g, sugars  by 7 g, and  sodium  by  0.8  mg.
© 2020  The  Authors.  Published  by Elsevier  B.V.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under  the CC
BY  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).. Introduction
The recent increase in diet-related health problems has
ed to much discussion about whether and how we can
mprove the quality of dietary intake in the population.
olicy makers have explored different ways to improve
ndividuals’ diets, such as by launching the “5-a-day” cam-
aign (Capacci and Mazzochi, 2011), introducing targeted
enefits for fruits and vegetables (Griffith et al., 2018a),
axing soft drinks (Fletcher et al., 2010; HM Treasury,
018), and encouraging manufacturers to reformulate their
roducts (Griffith et al., 2016a) for example by removing
rtificial trans-fats (Department of Health, 2011a). Another
olicy that has received much interest is nutrition labelling.
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.0/).This paper investigates the response to a large-scale
UK policy that introduced Front-of-Pack (FOP) nutrition
labels. In 2006, the UK Food Standards Agency (FSA) rec-
ommended retailers to adopt nutrition labelling on all
store-brand (as opposed to branded) products within seven
specific food categories.1 Although this recommendation
was voluntary, it was taken up by several retailers. We
start by exploring the overall, aggregate, impact of this
policy by comparing changes in food purchases at retail-
ers that introduced labelling to changes in purchases at
retailers that did not introduce labelling. We then inves-
tigate the households’ response by examining changes to
the quantity and nutritional quality of foods purchased, dis-
tinguishing between products that were labelled and those
that were not.
Our identification strategy uses three features. First, we
exploit the fact that the timing of the introduction of FOP
1 These are ready meals, burgers/sausages, pies, breaded/coated meats,
pizza, sandwiches and cereals.
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labels varied across retailers in a quasi-experiment. Sec-
ond, we use the fact that nutrition labelling was introduced
only for store-brand products within the seven food cat-
egories, but not for branded ones. Third, we account for
any fixed household–retailer characteristics (we refer to
the household-retailer combination as a spell), using only
within-spell changes in dietary choices.
We make three main contributions to the literature.
First, we exploit the quasi-experiment to estimate the
effects of the policy on the quantity of foods households
buy. Our triple-difference approach compares within-spell
changes in food choices before and after the introduction of
the policy for households shopping at retailers that intro-
duced labelling (i.e. ‘treated’ households) to within-spell
changes for households shopping elsewhere (i.e. ‘con-
trol’ households), distinguishing between store-brand (i.e.
those potentially affected by labelling) and branded (i.e.
not affected by labelling) products. We  do this separately
for foods that were recommended for labelling by the FSA
(i.e. ready meals, burgers/sausages, pies, etc.) and foods
that were not. Within the latter, we distinguish between
‘indulgence’ foods (i.e. cakes, desserts and cookies) and
everything else, due to their distinctly different nutri-
ent profiles. Indeed, these indulgence foods are the least
healthy on a number of nutrients and they are a large food
group on their own. Within each of these food groups, there
are store-brand and branded products, but only within the
foods recommended for labelling did (some) retailers intro-
duce a FOP label to their store-brand products.
Second, we explore whether the policy affected the
quality, or nutritional composition, of households’ shop-
ping baskets. We  use a Nutrient Profile Score that captures
the healthiness of foods to estimate whether the healthi-
ness of households’ shopping baskets changed in response
to the policy. We  also explore the effects of the policy on the
actual nutrient purchases, distinguishing between the four
nutrients shown on the FOP label: energy (kcal), saturated
fats, sugars and sodium.2
Finally, we  contribute to the debate on the poten-
tial heterogeneous effects of food policies. Several studies
show the importance of demographic and socio-economic
characteristics in explaining the use and understanding of
nutrition labels.3 We  build on this by incorporating such
heterogeneities into our quasi-experimental setting.
Nutrition labelling is a frequently discussed topic
in policy-circles because it is an attractive public pol-
icy that targets transparency (Weil et al., 2013) and
respects freedom of choice, without imposing hard regu-
lations. Standard economic theory suggests that disclosure
addresses typical market failures such as asymmetric infor-
mation (see for example, Loewenstein et al. (2014) for a
review and studies cited below). In addition, behavioural
2 In short, FOP labels provide a summary of the nutrient content for
100 g of each product, distinguishing between the amount of energy, sat-
urated fats, sugars, and sodium. We discuss this in more detail in Section
3.
3 See e.g. Guthrie et al. (1995), Nayga (1996), Drichoutis et al. (2005),
Darmon and Drewnowski (2008), Roos et al. (1998), Groth et al. (2001),
Hulshof et al. (2003), Lien et al. (2002), Shelton (2005) and Grunert et al.
(2010).alth Economics 72 (2020) 102326
economics suggests that individuals have a certain propen-
sity to err and may  systematically over- or under-estimate
the health consequences of their actions (Loewenstein
et al., 2014). Therefore, the introduction of labelling is jus-
tifiable to inform individuals of the costs they may  impose
on themselves, but may fail to internalise at the time
they shop. However, the expected effects of labelling are
ambiguous. They depend on households’ prior beliefs about
the ‘healthiness’ of their shopping baskets (see for example
Bollinger et al., 2011). In general, households are unlikely
to have perfect knowledge of the nutritional composition
of their purchases. Hence, labelling will increase the infor-
mation available to them. If they consider their shopping
baskets to be relatively healthy, but the labels suggest oth-
erwise, they may  decide to improve the nutritional quality
of their baskets with the introduction of labelling. Instead,
however, if nutritional labels indicate that products are
healthier than households initially believed, they may
decide to reduce the nutritional quality of their baskets.
Even if households are perfectly informed about the nutri-
tional content of their purchases, labelling may  increase its
salience and affect their food choices.
Studies in psychology suggest that the way information
is provided is important (see e.g. Loewenstein et al., 2014).
As individuals display limited attention and cognitive
knowledge, they will trade-off time and costs of finding and
interpreting information. A key aspect is therefore infor-
mation simplicity. However, studies investigating which
type of label is most effective show mixed findings. Some
studies find that categorical labels (e.g. displaying stars
or letter grades) are better understood than continuous
labels (see e.g. Thorne and Egan, 2002; Weil and McMahon,
2003; Malam et al., 2019), whilst others recommend the
use of a hybrid system that combines simple colour-coded
labels (also known as traffic lights) with Guideline Daily
Amounts (GDA; Malam et al., 2019).4 Others again show
that traffic lights lead to more correct nutrient interpre-
tation, and that they are better at inducing consumers
to switch to healthier foods than GDA-type labels (see
e.g. Kelly et al., 2009; Borgmeier and Westenhoefer, 2009;
Hawley et al., 2013). Sacks et al. (2009) find that the traf-
fic light system alone does not impact on the relative
healthiness of consumer purchases. Hence, despite nutri-
tion labelling being identified as an important determinant
of food choice, with consumer research suggesting that
labelling may  help improve the nutrition and health of
the population (Cowburn and Stockley, 2005; Lobstein and
Davies, 2009), whether (and which) labels improve house-
holds’ diets remains an empirical question.
Our results suggest that the introduction of labelling led
to a reduction in the quantity purchased of labelled store-
brand foods (i.e. ready meals, burgers/sausages, pies, etc.),
as well as an improvement in their nutritional composi-
tion, showing a reduction in monthly calories purchased (of
588 kcal), saturated fats (13.7 g), sugars (6.9 g), and sodium
4 GDAs display the contribution that each nutrient makes towards the
adult GDA, in percentages. For example, the adult GDA for calories is
2000 kcal per person per day. So if 100 g of a product provides 200 kcal,
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0.8 mg), with no significant changes in the nutritional
omposition of branded (and therefore unlabelled) ver-
ions of these foods. The changes are similar to a 9–14%
eduction in average nutrient purchases of labelled store-
rand foods, or a 0.1–0.9% change relative to the total
onthly nutrients from all foods. Furthermore, in addition
o improving the nutritional composition of labelled store-
rand foods, we find an improvement in the healthiness
f cakes, desserts and cookies. Although these results may
e counter-intuitive, as these foods remained unlabelled
hroughout our observation window, this suggests that the
ntroduction of FOP labels may  have urged households to
hink more widely about their dietary choices.5 Hence,
lthough cakes did not have front-of-pack labelling, the
ncreased salience of nutrition information may  have made
ouseholds more conscious of the nutritional contents
f their baskets, leading them to change the nutritional
alue of their grocery basket more generally, rather than
uch changes being confined to products with FOP labels
nly. Indeed, some psychological research reports that the
rovision of objective nutrition information can activate
elf-control and lead consumers to choose health over
ndulgence (see e.g. Hassan et al., 2010; Baumeister, 2002).
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section
 highlights the relevant literature and Section 3 discusses
he specific Front-of-Pack labelling policy that we exploit in
his paper. Section 4 describes the data, with Section 5 pre-
enting the empirical strategy, and Section 6 discussing the
esults. Section 7 presents the robustness analyses; Section
 concludes.
. Existing literature
There is a large literature on the determinants, use,
nderstanding, and effectiveness of nutrition information.
he most relevant work to our research is that related to
utrition labelling. A recent systematic review, investigat-
ng the relationship between food labelling and consumer
ood choices, finds that labelling is correlated with lower
ntake of energy and fats, whilst it increases vegetable con-
umption (Shangguan et al., 2019). Studies that focus on
onsumer preferences for labels find that consumers value
nformation on calories, but that calorie information alone
s not enough (Lando and Labiner-Wolfe, 2007; van Kleef
t al., 2007; Malam et al., 2019).
Grunert et al. (2010) show that the degree of under-
tanding of nutrition labels is much higher than its usage:
hilst only 27% of UK shoppers use nutrition information
hen making a selection in store, between 70% and 90%
f individuals show a correct understanding of the label.
evels of understanding are also higher among younger
ohorts and those in higher social classes (see also Sinclair
t al., 2013; Hess and Siegrist, 2012; Feng and Fox, 2018),
otentially due to better numeracy and health literacy
n these groups (Feng and Fox, 2018). As such, providing
5 Back-of-pack nutritional information is available on all products
hroughout our period of analysis. However, these generally use smaller
rints, with non-standardised nutritional information, and are considered
ess  easy to read.lth Economics 72 (2020) 102326 3
new information through nutrition labels may  differen-
tially impact the higher and lower socio-economic groups.
On the one hand, health capital theory argues that more
educated individuals are more efficient and productive in
their health investment decisions (Grossman, 1972), mean-
ing that we  may  see a larger response to labels for these
groups. On the other hand, these individuals have a higher
opportunity cost of time, reducing their ability to acquire
new information (Becker, 1977, 1975; Schultz, 1975). Fur-
thermore, if they are better informed about the nutritional
content of their grocery baskets, the labels do not necessar-
ily provide ‘new’ information, perhaps leading to smaller
changes in their dietary choices compared to the lower
socio-economic groups, for whom the nutritional labels are
more informative. Hence, it is unclear for which groups we
expect labels to have a stronger effect, and it remains an
empirical question which we explore below.
A second strand of the literature is concerned with
identifying the causal consumer responses to food policies
using quasi-experiments such as the introduction of the
U.S. Nutrition Labelling and Education Act (NLEA) in the
mid-1990s (Heike and Taylor, 2013; Guthrie et al., 1995;
Wisdom et al., 2010), the introduction of menu calorie
labelling in restaurants and food chains (Restrepo, 2016;
Bleich et al., 2016, 2015; Downs et al., 2009; Bollinger et al.,
2011; Elbel et al., 2009; Mathios, 2000; Variyam, 2008), the
use of health advertising information in the cereal market
(Ippolito and Mathios, 1990, 1995) and the introduction of
FOP labels and a fat tax in France (Allais et al., 2015). These
studies find some evidence of improved dietary choices
due to the interventions, though the effectiveness often
depends on the socio-economic and demographic charac-
teristics of consumers.
Also related is the literature that explores the effect of
labelling using field and lab experiments (Berning et al.,
2010; Cawley et al., 2015; Kiesel and Villas-Boas, 2013;
Heike and Taylor, 2013; Dubois et al. 2020). For example,
Berning et al. (2010) argue that labelling on healthy foods
may  in fact decrease their purchases as products are per-
ceived to be less tasty. However, Cawley et al. (2015) find
that the introduction of a nutrition rating system led con-
sumers to buy a more nutritious mix  of products. Using
a large RCT of front-of-pack nutrition labels, Dubois et al.
(2020) also finds small improvements in the nutritional
quality of labelled foods.
Finally, although we only speak to this indirectly, a
further strand of literature is concerned with the (strate-
gic) responses of manufacturers and retailers to food
policies (see e.g. Bonnet and Réquillart, 2013a,b; Griffith
et al., 2016b,a; Namba et al., 2013; Nakamura and Zerom,
2010; Unnevehr and Jagmanaite, 2008; Shangguan et al.,
2019). For instance, Griffith et al. (2016a) show that three-
quarters of the reduction in salt intake following the UK
government’s strategy to reduce salt consumption was
due to reformulation of food products by manufactur-
ers. Similarly, Unnevehr and Jagmanaite (2008) argue that
incentives to disclose the trans-fat contents in foods have
led to product reformulation and modern biotechnology
development of improved oilseed. Consistent with this,
the meta-analysis by Shangguan et al. (2019) shows that
food labelling significantly reduced the contents of trans-
al of He4 E. Fichera and S. von Hinke / Journ
fats and sodium (see also Namba et al., 2013; Wu  and
Sturm, 2014; Louie et al., 2012; Vyth et al., 2009). In sum-
mary, therefore, this literature shows that manufacturers
actively respond to government policies by reformulating
their products and investing in technological development,
directly affecting households’ shopping baskets.
3. Front-of-Pack labelling
In 2006, the UK Food Standards Agency (FSA) recom-
mended retailers to start Front-of-Pack (FOP) labelling for
store-brand products on seven types of food: ready meals,
burgers/sausages, pies, breaded/coated meats, pizza, sand-
wiches and cereals. These foods were chosen because
consumer research indicated that individuals had diffi-
culty assessing their nutritional quality, and because they
tend to be eaten frequently or in large quantities (Denny,
2006). Although the recommendation was voluntary and
carried no penalties, it was taken up by several UK retailers:
Waitrose, Co-Op, and Marks & Spencer (M&S) introduced
FOP labelling for all seven types of food in March 2006,
September 2006, and January 2007, respectively; and Asda
introduced it on six types (all except cereals) in September
2007 (British Retailing Consortium and personal corre-
spondence, 2015).6 There is no evidence that the FSA
lobbied with other manufacturers to introduce labelling.
In fact, FOP labelling was not adopted by any of the major
food manufacturers (NHF, 2007b). Therefore, labelling was
only introduced for store-brand versions of the seven food
categories within specific retailers, with no changes in the
labelling of branded products.
FOP labels provide a summary of the nutritional content
of each food product, showing the amount of energy, satu-
rated fats, sugars and sodium. This information is provided
per 100 g or millilitres, with some products additionally
providing the information per serving if the serving size
is greater than 100 g (Food Standards Agency, 2007).
There are three types of FOP labels currently in use: the
traffic light system (TLS), guideline daily amounts (GDAs)
and a hybrid version using elements of both. TLS is a colour
coded scheme, denoting the amount of calories, fats, salt
and sugars in a product by the colours red (high), amber
(medium) and green (low). Both the colour and its char-
acterisation as low, medium or high are displayed on the
FOP label. GDAs show the contribution that each of these
nutrients make towards the adult GDA, but do not involve
colours.7 The hybrid scheme combines the former two, dis-
6 Table B.1, Appendix B, shows when each retailer introduced labelling
and distinguishes between the type of label introduced. We use infor-
mation on the latter in Section 7.6. Tesco and Sainsbury’s had already
introduced a labelling system prior to the FSA recommendations (see
British Retailing Consortium). We include purchases from Tesco in our
analyses, but do not consider Sainsbury’s because, although they intro-
duced labelling from January 2005, they phased out the introduction for
the seven food categories over several months and would not specify the
exact date of introduction.
7 The nutrient guidelines are based on figures published in the Dietary
Reference Values for Food Energy and Nutrients for the UK, published by
the Committee on Medical Aspects of Food and Nutrition Policy (COMA)
in  1991 (Department of Health, 1991). For salt, recommendations of the
Scientific Committee on Nutrition (SACN) were followed (Public Healthalth Economics 72 (2020) 102326
playing both colour coding and percentage contributions
on the key nutrients. In our sample, retailers introduced
different labels: Waitrose and Co-Op introduced a Traffic
Light System, whilst Marks & Spencer and Asda introduced
a hybrid system (see also Table B.1, Appendix B). The other
retailers did not introduce any labelling scheme. The choice
regarding labelling introduction as well as the type of label
were entirely up to retailers; we  return to this issue below.
4. Data and descriptive statistics
We  use data on all grocery purchases brought into the
home by a rolling panel of households from Great Britain.
Our analysis focuses on the period July 2005 to July 2008,
when only the four retailers mentioned above introduced
nutrition labelling.8 The data are collected by the market
research firm Kantar Worldpanel, who  ensure the panel
remains broadly representative over time, with household
demographics being routinely collected and re-assessed
approximately every nine months (Leicester and Oldfield,
2009). Purchases are recorded at the individual transac-
tion level using a handheld scanner in the home. The data
also contain information on non-barcoded items such as
loose fruit and vegetables or meat from the meat counter.9
The advantages of these data are that they are longitu-
dinal, they provide various demographic characteristics,
and report very detailed information on each food product.
We have information on quantities, prices, and charac-
teristics at the level of the individual product, including
whether it was  on promotion and the products’ nutritional
values. The detailed product-level information allows us
to identify precisely which foods in which retailers were
exposed to the new nutrition labelling (e.g. store-brand
versus branded foods).
Although these data are increasingly used in economics
and social science research, it is important to also highlight
their limitations. For instance, it is known that there are dif-
ficulties to attract some demographic groups, such as single
young males. Furthermore, given the longitudinal nature
of the data, participants may  suffer from ‘survey fatigue’,
reducing their reporting accuracy over time. Leicester and
Oldfield (2009) show that such fatigue effects are stronger
for top-up products (e.g. bread, milk). We  discuss how
we deal with this below. To avoid potential biases, Kantar
themselves also take considerable effort to monitor partic-
ipants and remove them from the panel if they believe this
is a problem (Griffith et al., 2018a).
Leicester and Oldfield (2009) and Griffith and O’Connell
(2009) include a detailed investigation of the quality of the
Kantar data, and compare the data to other UK surveys.
England, 2019), while calculations for total sugars were as described by
Rayner et al. (2004).
8 We explicitly end the observation window before the start of the Great
Recession, as its effects on food prices and disposable incomes may  vary
across localities in the UK. Furthermore, the European Parliament voted
in  favour of FOP labelling in July 2010. By ending the period of observation
before any such new Regulations, we again avoid potential confounding
by  other factors.
9 Households are given a booklet with barcodes for various non-
barcoded foods for them to scan and record purchase information.
























































Descriptive statistics – households.
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Household size: 1 0.161 (0.368)
Household size: 2 0.369 (0.482)
Household size: 3 0.195 (0.396)
Household size: 4 0.180 (0.385)
Household size: 5+ 0.094 (0.292)
No. of children: 0 0.628 (0.483)
No. of children: 1 0.162 (0.368)
No. of children: 2 0.148 (0.355)
No. of children: 3+ 0.062 (0.242)
Married 0.635 (0.481)
Single 0.204 (0.403)
Divorced/widowed/ separated 0.161 (0.367)
Higher social class 0.461 (0.499)
Intermediate social class 0.374 (0.484)
Lower social class 0.165 (0.371)
Employment: FT 0.332 (0.471)




Employment: retired 0.220 (0.415)
Age 48.560 (15.482)
Female 0.785 (0.411)
No. of households 20,707
the response to labelling differs for this food group com-
pared to others.13 For each of the food categories, weE. Fichera and S. von Hinke / Journ
hey show that conditioning on households that regularly
eport spending on a range of grocery products ensures
hat the Kantar data follow the patterns and trends seen in
ther UK data sources. Leicester and Oldfield (2009) com-
are the Kantar data to the Living Cost and Food Survey
LCFS; one of the main UK food and nutrition surveys), as
ell as the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and con-
lude that attrition and reporting error are relatively low.
urthermore, they show that the data have similar socio-
emographic and regional profiles (see also Quirmbach
t al., 2018), suggesting that they are broadly representa-
ive of the UK population.
Looking specifically at the nutritional data, Griffith and
’Connell (2009) show that the Kantar data provides sig-
ificantly more information than what is available in the
CFS or the National Diet and Nutrition Survey (NDNS;
he other main UK food and nutrition survey). Further-
ore, they show that the Kantar data avoids the problem
f under-reporting that is well-known to occur in intake
urveys.
Our analysis is based on households’ main monthly
hopping trip. We  focus on this sample for three reasons.
irst, households tend to buy the majority of their food in
heir main shopping trip, allowing us to investigate how
hey substitute across as well as within food groups. Indeed,
ur data indicate that households purchase 70% of all foods
n their main shopping trip. Second, consumer research
as identified time spent shopping as an important deter-
inant of labelling use (Nayga et al., 1998; Park et al.,
542; Beatty and Smith, 1987; Mothersbaugh et al., 1993).
e therefore focus on the shopping occasions for which
abelling use may  be more binding. Third, focusing on
he main shopping trip implies that survey fatigue, which
s strongest for top-up products (Leicester and Oldfield,
009), plays less of a role. To define the main monthly
hopping trip, we take the sum of all purchases in each
ousehold-month-shop ID combination, where shop ID
enotes the shop postcode, and select the highest monthly
ood spending.10
We  follow the literature and drop household-months
uring which the household does not record purchasing
nything for seven days (see e.g. Griffith and O’Connell,
009; Leicester and Oldfield, 2009; Griffith et al., 2016a,
018a).11 We  consider a number of demographics, includ-
ng household size, the number of children, a binary
ndicator whether the main shopper is full-time or part-
ime employed, is retired, or unemployed/not working,
arital status, social class, and the age and gender of the
ain shopper.12
10 For households who  shop at multiple shops, we  explored the robust-
ess of our estimates to weighting the expenditures by the inverse of the




, where q is the
uantity purchased (in kg) in one shop ID, and
∑
sums over all transac-
ions in a month (in all shop IDs)). The estimates are robust to this different
pecification.
11 Our results are robust to dropping household-months during which
he household does not record purchasing anything for 14 days. We  dis-
uss  these in the robustness analyses; Section 7.6.
12 We follow Griffith et al. (2016a) and base our classification of
ocioeconomic status on the National Readership Survey social grade;Notes: Sample mean displayed, with standard deviations in parenthe-
ses. Any individual-level covariates (e.g. age, female) refer to the main
shopper.
Our main analysis considers nine of the biggest retail-
ers in the UK: Tesco, Asda, Morrisons, Somerfield, Co-Op,
Waitrose, Lidl, Aldi, and Marks & Spencer, with a total
market share of 76%, ranging from 2% for Asda to 32%
for Tesco, although our estimates are robust to using
all retailers. We  sum up all household purchases for a
set of food ‘categories’, such as ready meals, burgers,
dairy foods, and cookies, which each belong to one of
the following food groups: “Foods with labelling” (i.e.
those recommended for labelling by the FSA), and “Foods
without labelling”, where – within the latter – we  distin-
guish between cakes/desserts/cookies and all other foods
without labelling due to their distinctly different nutri-
ent profiles. Furthermore, Grunert et al. (2010) show that
consumers prefer not to see nutrition information on
‘indulgence products’. Hence, separating this food group
from other unlabelled foods allows us to explore whetherdistinguish between store-brand and branded foods, so
a standard approach in market research. Higher social classes include
top managerial roles, administrative roles and professional occupa-
tions; intermediate classes include supervisory roles, clerical and
junior management, and skilled manual occupations; and lower classes
include semi-skilled and unskilled manual workers, unemployed and
lower grade occupations. The socioeconomic classification is based
on  the occupation of the main earner. More details are available
at  http://www.nrs.co.uk/nrs-print/lifestyle-and-classification-data/ [last
accessed in August 2019].
13 We hereafter refer to cakes/desserts/cookies as “Cakes”. We drop
sandwiches and cereals from our analyses for two reasons. First,
sandwiches are generally purchased for immediate consumption, and
therefore not brought into the home and not observed in these data. Sec-
ond, Asda’s breakfast cereals were not labelled until several months after
labelling was introduced for other products. However, as cereals are gen-
6 E. Fichera and S. von Hinke / Journal of Health Economics 72 (2020) 102326
Table 2
Baseline descriptive statistics – outcome variables.
Quantity (kg) Nutritional quality Energy (kcal) Saturated fats (g) Sugars (g) Sodium (mg)
Store-brands
Total basket 42.7 (30.4) 5.0 (2.0) 51,606 (37,070) 853.3 (674.8) 2622.2 (2110.6) 85.0 (126.4)
Foods  with labelling 2.9 (2.8) 7.7 (4.8) 4757 (5321) 95.1 (113.3) 54.9 (69.1) 8.6 (9.7)
Foods  without labelling 38.2 (28.1) 4.0 (1.8) 39,438 (29,601) 596.1 (517.2) 1912.3 (1667.5) 71.9 (123.2)
Cakes  (no labelling) 2.5 (2.4) 15.1 (8.2) 7411 (8471) 162.1 (194.7) 655.0 (781.7) 4.5 (5.5)
No.  of observations 25,446 25,446 25,446 25,446 25,446 25,446
Branded foods
Total basket 18.6 (15.7) 9.0 (2.7) 34,000 (26,380) 581.3 (495.3) 2227.9 (2261.1) 61.32 (78.6)
Foods with labelling 1.7 (1.6) 7.0 (6.3) 2358 (3259) 51.4 (77.2) 18.0 (28.1) 4.8 (7.0)
Foods  without labelling 15.4 (13.7) 7.4 (3.6) 23,425 (19,121) 341.7 (328.0) 1489.0 (1830.9) 51.8 (75.4)
Cakes  (no labelling) 2.5 (2.4) 16.6 (8.1) 8218 (9298) 188.3 (230.5) 720.8 (872.6) 4.6 (5.4)
No.  of observations 24,754 24,754 24,754 24,754 24,754 24,754
s presen
n; July 2
e AppenNotes: The table shows the sample mean of the different outcome variable
are  based on the baseline period (i.e. the period before labelling introductio
profile score (see Rayner et al., 2004). For more detail about this score, se
that the total spending for store-brand and branded foods
sums up to the total home food basket (except for break-
fast cereals). Therefore, each observation in our dataset is a
household-food category-brand type-store-month-year.14
Our main dataset includes 360,921 observations for 20,707
households between July 2005 and July 2008.
Table 1 presents the main household characteristics,
showing that the majority of households contain 2 or 3
individuals. 64% of households are married, and 46% are in
higher social classes. The main shopper is predominantly
female, with an average age of 48.6.15 Table 2 presents the
baseline (i.e. before March 2006, when the first labelling
scheme was introduced) means and standard deviations
of the quantity and nutritional quality of households’
shopping baskets, including the total monthly nutrients
purchased.16 Information on nutrients is collected by Kan-
tar from the back of pack nutrient information. Where
nutritional labels are unavailable because products do
not display them (e.g. fruit and vegetables), Kantar uses
nutrients from McCance and Widdowson (2014), and they
erally consumed for breakfast only, it is unlikely that dropping them would
affect the substitution with other meals.
14 Within the “foods with labelling” group, the food categories include
ready meals, burgers, pies, meats, and pizza. Within the “foods without
labelling” group, the food categories include dairy, breads/pasta, snacks,
and fish/poultry. Within the “Cakes” group, the food categories include
cakes, desserts and cookies/biscuits. ‘Brand type’ refers to either store-
brand or branded products.
15 Note that this does not imply that our sample differs from the gen-
der distribution of the general UK population. Instead, the individual-level
characteristics reported in Table 1 refer to the main shopper in the house-
hold, which – for the majority of households – tends to be the female.
This is consistent with other data sources such as the Living Cost and
Food Survey (see e.g. von Hinke, 2020).
16 The nutritional quality score is based on the Nutrient Profiling Model
used by the FSA (Rayner et al., 2004). In short, this attaches a score to each
individual product depending on the amount of energy, saturated fats,
sugar, sodium, fibre, proteins, fruit and vegetables it contains. It separately
looks at negative and positive nutrients (where the former include energy,
saturated fats, sugar and sodium; for more information, see Appendix A).
In  our analysis, we  only use the negative score of the Nutrient Profile
Model, since these are the exact nutrients that are shown on the FOP label
and therefore made more salient by this policy. Higher scores indicate
more unhealthy foods. We  report the average score across all individual
products within a food category.ted in the columns, with standard deviations in parentheses. All statistics
005 to March 2006). The nutritional quality is measured using the nutrient
dix A.
impute nutrients from similar products when foods are
purchased with insufficient frequency.
Table 2 shows that the quantity purchased is highest for
foods without labelling, both for store-brands and branded
foods. Households purchase approximately 5 kg of cakes
a month, split equally between store-brand and branded
products. This food group is the most unhealthy, with a
nutrient profile score of 15–17, and with branded products




We  start by evaluating the overall effect of FOP labelling
using a difference-in-difference design, comparing the
change in spending, quantity or nutritional value of food
purchases in retailers that introduced labelling (before and
after its introduction) to the change in retailers that did
not introduce labelling. This provides an estimate of the
aggregate effect of the policy, given by:
yjrt = ˛0,j + ˛1,jLabellingrt + r,j + t,j + rt,j, (1)
where yjrt is the quantity (in kg), nutritional value (i.e.
nutrient profile score), total spending or expenditure share
of food group j (with j = 1, 2, 3, i.e. labelled foods, unla-
belled foods and cakes), purchased in retailer r at time
(year-month) t. Labellingrt is a dummy  that is equal to one
if retailer r introduced labelling by time t. Retailer fixed
effects are denoted by  r,j , t,j are time fixed effects, and
rt,j is the error term. The parameter ˛1,j captures the effect
of labelling introduction on the outcome of interest, com-
paring retailers that introduced labelling to those that did
not. We  also estimate this model for the entire food basket
(i.e. j ∈ 1, 2, 3), allowing us to estimate the overall effect
of the labelling policy on retailers that introduced labelling
versus those that did not.In addition to estimating the aggregate effect of the pol-
icy, which would be of interest to public health officials and
policy makers, we examine whether households substitute














































the same retailer. The identifying assumption is that after
controlling for demographics and spell fixed effects, store-
specific demand shocks, or valuation of food groups, areE. Fichera and S. von Hinke / Journ
uction of labelling. To investigate this in more detail, we
xplore the household-level data and turn to a triple differ-
nce approach where we distinguish between store-brand
some of which were labelled) and branded products (none
f which were labelled).
.2. Difference-in-difference-in-difference models
To investigate whether the introduction of FOP labelling
ffected the quantity of foods purchased by households
nd the nutritional quality of their food baskets, whilst
istinguishing between labelled foods, unlabelled foods
nd (unlabelled) cakes as well as between store-brand and









jk ln phit,k + ıxht + jZht + s,j + jt




indicates either the quantity or nutritional qual-
ty of food category i nested within food group j, purchased
y household h at time t, where again j = {1, 2, 3}. Similar
o above, we also estimate this model for the entire food
asket (i.e. j ∈ 1, 2, 3), allowing us to explore the overall
ffect of FOP labelling on households’ food shopping.
Labellinght is a dummy  variable that is equal to 1 if the
etailer that household h shops at introduced labelling by
ime t. Hence, there is temporal variation in the time of
abelling introduction, as well as household-level variation
n the choice of retailer. Both of these may  be endogenous,
s the retailer decides if and when to start its labelling, and
he household chooses where to do its grocery shopping.
e discuss both issues in more detail below.
SBhi,j is a dummy  variable that equals 1 if food cat-
gory i within food group j purchased by household h
s store-brand and 0 otherwise, and prices are denoted
y phit,k, with j and k indicating different food groups.17
ence, prices are household-specific, reflecting the fact
hat households shop in different stores and therefore face
ifferent prices, but also that they choose different prod-
cts within each food category. We  discuss how we deal
ith potential endogeneity of prices (as well as total food
pending, denoted by xht) below.
Zht is a vector of household demographic variables dis-
ussed above, and s,j are spell fixed effects, where the
pell-level heterogeneity is defined as s,j ≡ ϑh,j + r(h,t),j
as in Abowd et al. (1999) and Andrews et al. (2006)). In
ther words, we include household-retailer combination
xed effects, accounting for any time-invariant hetero-
eneity within these spells. This allows us to estimate how
j
hit
changes within a particular household-retailer combi-
ation, before and after the introduction of labelling for
tore-brand and branded foods. We  control for a general
17 Prices are deflated by the Consumer Price Index for food and drinks
ith November 2005 as base period.lth Economics 72 (2020) 102326 7
trend in consumption over time, captured by jt, and allow
for retailer-specific linear departures of this trend, denoted
by  r(h,t),j × t. Finally, t,j are year and month dummies,
accounting for systematic changes in yj
hit
across years, as
well as for any seasonality, and uhit,j is the error term, clus-
tered by household. We are interested in the estimates of
ˇ1,j and ˇ2,j , which capture the effect of the introduction
of labelling on the quantity and quality of food purchases
for store-brand and branded foods respectively.18
Hence, our analysis compares within-spell changes in
food choices before and after the introduction of the pol-
icy for households that shop at retailers that introduced
labelling (‘treated households’), to within-spell changes for
households shopping elsewhere (‘control households’). As
such, observing a reduction in the Nutrient Profile Score for
e.g. labelled foods after the introduction of labelling would
suggest that households change their dietary choices within
labelled foods to make them healthier.19
5.3. Identification
To estimate the parameters in Eq. (2) consistently, we
require strict exogeneity of uhit,j . There are two potential
concerns with this, relating to the orthogonality of prices
as well as total expenditures. Prices are likely to be endoge-
nous, as they partially reflect differences in quality from
one household to another, and therefore depend on house-
hold tastes (Deaton, 1988). For example, we are likely to
observe higher prices for households whose food basket
consists of higher quality products.
Total expenditures (xht) may  be endogenous due to
measurement error or unobserved household-level char-
acteristics being correlated with the quantity and quality
of purchases. For example, any idiosyncratic demand or
preference shocks, or taste heterogeneity, may  affect the
quantity and quality of purchases, as well as total expendi-
tures.
We deal with these issues in three ways. First, we
include a vector of household demographic variables, Zht ,
discussed above. Second, we  exploit the panel structure of
our data and include spell fixed effects s,j , exploiting only
variation in the quantity, quality, prices, and total expendi-
tures within spells. And third, we  instrument for prices and
total food spending.
Our main analysis instruments for prices, using an
approach similar to Hausman (1994) and Nevo (2001),
where the instruments are defined as the prices faced by
households if they had shopped in other stores within18 Appendix D discusses and shows the estimates where we embed this
triple difference approach into an Almost Ideal demand System (AIDS;
Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980), modelling the expenditure shares and
allowing us to explore whether households substitute between the three
food groups.
19 This triple difference approach assumes that the trend for treated
households would be similar to the trend for control households in the
absence of labelling. As we  show later (see Section 7.3), we find no evi-
dence to reject this assumption.
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independent across stores. Although other store prices also
reflect quality, they do not reflect household h’s specific val-
uation of the quality. Given this, a demand shock for one
food group is independent of the price of the food in other
stores.20 We  follow Griffith et al. (2018a) and instrument
for total food spending using total expenditure on fast mov-
ing consumer goods.21 This assumes that preferences for
non-food products are weakly separable from preferences
over the different food groups.
6. Results
This section presents the estimates of the effect of the
introduction of FOP labelling on household food choices.
However, before we do so, we report the aggregate effect
of the policy on retailers, as in Eq. (1). Table B.1 of Appendix
B presents the estimates. Panel A shows the effects on the
quantity and nutritional quality of foods sold, and Panel
B shows the estimates for total (absolute) spending and
expenditure shares. For each of these outcomes, we show
the effects for the total food basket (columns 1 and 5),
and for the three food groups separately (columns 2–4 and
6–8). Recall here that higher nutrient profile scores indicate
unhealthier foods. The findings show that, at the aggregate
level, the policy improved the nutritional quality of the
total food basket, with no statistically significant changes
in quantity, total spending and expenditure shares (except
for a small positive effect on quantity for foods without
labelling). With no change in spending and quantity, but
an improvement in the nutritional quality, this suggests
that retailers sold similar amounts of foods post labelling
introduction, but this consisted of different – healthier –
products.
We next explore whether the introduction of FOP
labelling changed households’ quantity and quality of foods
purchased, as well as whether it led to substitution
between labelled (i.e. store-brand foods of seven specific
food categories) and unlabelled foods (i.e. all other store-
brand foods, and all branded products). Table 3 presents
the estimates of the triple difference specification from
Eq. (2). Columns 1–4 use the natural logarithm of quan-
tity as the dependent variable; columns 5–8 specify the
nutritional quality. For each of these, we again show esti-
mates for the entire food basket (columns 1 and 5), and for
each of the three food groups separately (columns 2–4 and
6–8).22Looking first at the quantity and quality of the total food
basket (columns 1 and 5), we find that the introduction of
labelling led to a reduction in the total quantity of branded
foods and an increase in the quantity of store-brand
20 In Section 7.2, we  explore the sensitivity of these analyses to using
alternative definitions of the instrument.
21 This includes other items that are commonly purchased in super-
markets, such as toiletries and household products. We  refer to this as
non-food.
22 All estimates are obtained from IV regressions, using “Hausman”-type
instruments for prices and instrumenting food spending with non-food
spending. The first stage F-statistics exceed the critical values outlined in
Stock and Yogo (2005), suggesting our instruments are sufficiently strong.
We  do not report these here; they are available upon request.alth Economics 72 (2020) 102326
foods. This coincided with a change in the composition of
store-brand food purchases, making them healthier (i.e.
a reduction in the nutrient profile score). Looking more
closely at the three food groups that make up the total
food basket, however, we  find that the aggregate effect
conceals differential effects across the three food groups.
More specifically, we  find that the introduction of labelling
reduced the quantity of store-brand foods by 6.5%, whilst
improving their nutritional composition. Simultaneously,
consumers increased their purchases of unlabelled store-
brand foods and reduced purchases of unlabelled branded
foods. Finally, we  find that labelling led to an improve-
ment in the nutritional composition of store-brand cakes,
but a reduction in branded ones. Although the impact of
the introduction of FOP labels on unlabelled foods may
be counter-intuitive, this suggests that nutrition labelling
has made households more aware and conscious of the
nutritional content of their grocery baskets, leading them
to make changes to their grocery basket more generally,
rather than those confined to labelled products only. We
return to this point in the conclusion.
We next explore what the changes in nutrient profiles
mean in terms of actual nutrient content of the shopping
basket. Table 4 distinguishes between the four nutrients
that are displayed on the FOP label, showing that house-
holds responded by reducing the total monthly calories
from store-brand labelled food purchases by 588 kcal, sat-
urated fats by 13.7 g, sugars by 6.9 g, and sodium by 0.8 mg,
with no significant changes in the nutritional composition
of branded foods within the same food group (columns
2 and 6). Relative to mean monthly nutrient purchases
of store-brand labelled foods (see Table 2), these changes
are similar to a 9–14% reduction, on average.23 Similar to
Table 3, we find an improvement in the nutritional compo-
sition of store-brand cakes: a reduction of 400 kcal, 11.5 g
saturated fats, 37.9 g of sugars, and 0.58 mg  of sodium.
In sum, our results suggest that introduction of nutrition
labelling affected household food choices, reducing the
quantity of store-brand labelled foods, whilst improving
their nutritional quality.
7. Robustness analyses
We  next explore the robustness of our findings, inves-
tigating the sensitivity to the use of different instrument
sets for prices, exploring the timing of the labelling effects,
investigating potential spillover effects, and accounting for
retailers’ stock of products. We  also run the analysis with
different empirical specifications and sample definitions,
and we end with an investigation of potential heteroge-
23 For example, a reduction of 588 kcal from store-brand labelled foods
is  12% of average monthly kcals obtained from store-brand labelled foods
(i.e. from 4757 kcal; see Table 2). However, it is only 0.6% of the total
monthly kcal purchases from all (store-brand, branded, labelled and unla-
belled) foods (i.e. the total basket being 51,606 + 34,000 kcal, on average),
even when taking into account the small (insignificant) increase of 85 kcal
from branded labelled foods (see Table 4). Reductions in saturated fats,
sugars and sodium from store-brand labelled foods were 14%, 13% and
9%  respectively, relative to the average monthly nutrients obtained from
store-brand labelled foods, or 0.9%, 0.1%, and 0.6% relative to the total
monthly nutrients from all foods.
E. Fichera and S. von Hinke / Journal of Health Economics 72 (2020) 102326 9
Table  3
Triple-difference models of quantity and nutritional quality.
ln(Quantity) Nutritional quality














Labelling, store-brand 0.014** −0.065** 0.022** 0.010 −0.112* −0.291* 0.126* −0.795**
(0.003) (0.015) (0.005) (0.016) (0.056) (0.114) (0.050) (0.154)
Labelling, branded −0.013** 0.014 −0.012** −0.045** 0.025 0.105 −0.131** 0.508**
(0.002) (0.012) (0.004) (0.013) (0.044) (0.089) (0.039) (0.120)
Store-brand −0.249 −1.545 0.029 −0.093 −12.257** −6.789 −16.893** 2.167
(0.147) (0.809) (0.244) (0.861) (3.036) (6.153) (2.680) (8.283)
No.  of observations 360,921 360,921 360,921 360,921 360,921 360,921 360,921 360,921
Notes: The outcome variables include the (natural) logarithm of quantity (in kg; columns 1–4) and the nutrient profile score (columns 5–8). We  provide
estimates for the total food basket (columns 1 and 5), as well as for each of the three food groups (columns 2–4 and 6–8). The table shows the estimates
from  the triple difference specification in Eq. (2). All specifications control for household-level covariates, time trends, retailer-specific time trends, year
and  month dummies, and spell fixed effects. All models instrument for prices and expenditure using the prices faced by households if they had shopped in
other stores within the same retailer, and non-food spending, respectively. Standard errors, clustered by household, shown in parentheses.
* p < 0.05.
** p < 0.01.
Table 4
Triple-difference models of the nutritional composition of the food basket.
Calories (kcal) Saturated fats (g)















Labelling, store-brand −688.55 −587.56** 298.66 −399.91** −15.50 −13.69** 9.71 −11.53**
(377.06) (77.22) (314.15) (139.28) (8.00) (1.74) (6.50) (3.47)
Labelling, branded −36.65 84.61 −70.97 −49.79 −15.56* 2.14 −14.26** −3.44
(293.14) (60.03) (244.23) (108.28) (6.22) (1.35) (5.05) (2.70)
Store-brand −39,925.23* −9293.11* −37,181.94* 6548.33 −1081.51* −194.79* −888.92* 2.16
(20,106.18) (4117.58) (16,751.41) (7427.11) (426.66) (92.73) (346.69) (185.19)
Sugars (g) Sodium (mg)















Labelling, store-brand −49.05 −6.89** −4.31 −37.86** −3.89 −0.82** −2.49 −0.58**
(30.18) (0.98) (26.73) (13.05) (2.00) (0.15) (1.98) (0.09)
Labelling, branded 13.85 0.96 8.93 3.96 0.35 −0.06 0.45 −0.04
(23.46) (0.76) (20.78) (10.14) (1.55) (0.11) (1.54) (0.07)
Store–brand −1329.63 −62.12 −1396.84 129.16 −150.71 −9.97 −136.34 −4.39
(1609.42) (52.44) (1425.38) (695.62) (106.56) (7.77) (105.63) (4.74)
No.  of observations 360,921 360,921 360,921 360,921 360,921 360,921 360,921 360,921
Notes: The outcome variables include the individual nutrients that make up the shopping basket, distinguishing between calories (in kcal; Panel A, columns
1–4),  saturated fats (in grams; Panel A, columns 5–8), sugars (in grams; Panel B, columns 1–4), and sodium (in milligrams; Panel B, columns 5–8). We  provide
estimates for the total food basket (columns 1 and 5), as well as for each of the three food groups (columns 2–4 and 6–8). The table shows the estimates
from  the triple difference specification in Eq. (2), where the dependent variable is the individual nutrient. All specifications control for household-level
covariates, time trends, retailer-specific time trends, year and month dummies, and spell fixed effects. All models instrument for prices and expenditure







lustered by household, shown in parentheses.
* p < 0.05.
** p < 0.01.
eous effects. However, before we do this, we explore the
otential effects of FOP labelling on retailers.
.1. Retailer analysisOne potentially important consequence of the introduc-
ion of labelling is that retailers themselves may  respond,
dopting their own strategies in response to labellingintroduction. Since our data capture consumer choices (as
opposed to retailer decisions), we  are restricted in the
extent to which we  can explore this, which mainly refers to
the fact that we do not observe retailer prices or inventory
data, but have to rely on consumer purchases to observe the
relevant variables. Appendix C discusses the issues that this
raises in more detail and also shows our descriptive anal-
ysis, where we  investigate the effect of the introduction of
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Table 5
Robustness checks: triple-difference models using different instrument sets.
ln(Quantity) Nutritional quality















Labelling, store-brand 0.010** −0.114** 0.018** 0.006 0.086 −0.175 0.182** −0.595**
(0.003) (0.015) (0.005) (0.016) (0.051) (0.105) (0.050) (0.153)
Labelling, branded −0.011** 0.045** −0.009* −0.047** −0.171** 0.054 −0.187** 0.276*
(0.002) (0.011) (0.004) (0.013) (0.039) (0.081) (0.039) (0.119)
Store-brand −0.304* −1.904* 0.012 −0.314 −11.939** −3.661 −16.852** 0.878
(0.151) (0.795) (0.244) (0.871) (2.738) (5.662) (2.707) (8.270)
Panel  B
Labelling, store-brand 0.015** −0.073** 0.025** 0.010 −0.085 −0.250* 0.130** −0.798**
(0.003) (0.015) (0.005) (0.016) (0.054) (0.110) (0.050) (0.154)
Labelling, branded −0.014** 0.021 −0.014** −0.045** −0.001 0.075 −0.134** 0.516**
(0.002) (0.012) (0.004) (0.012) (0.042) (0.086) (0.039) (0.120)
Store-brand −0.243 −1.565* 0.038 −0.112 −12.169** −6.245 −16.888** 2.363
(0.147) (0.797) (0.246) (0.860) (2.911) (5.960) (2.678) (8.284)
Panel  C
Labelling, store-brand 0.009** −0.085** 0.025** −0.003 −0.052 −0.402** 0.166** −0.809**
(0.003) (0.015) (0.005) (0.017) (0.053) (0.138) (0.050) (0.155)
Labelling, branded −0.010** 0.029* −0.014** −0.035** −0.037 0.155 −0.173** 0.523**
(0.002) (0.012) (0.004) (0.013) (0.041) (0.108) (0.039) (0.121)
Store-brand −0.289 −1.634* 0.047 −0.166 −12.276** −9.753 −16.930** 2.214
(0.152) (0.782) (0.246) (0.870) (2.814) (7.386) (2.688) (8.302)
No.  of observations 360,921 360,921 360,921 360,921 360,921 360,921 360,921 360,921
Notes: The outcome variables include the (natural) logarithm of quantity (in kg; columns 1–4) and the nutrient profile score (columns 5–8). We provide
estimates for the total food basket (columns 1 and 5), as well as for each of the three food groups (columns 2–4 and 6–8). The table shows the estimates
from  the triple difference specification in Eq. (2). All specifications control for household-level covariates, time trends, retailer-specific time trends, year
and  month dummies, and spell fixed effects. Panel A instruments prices and expenditures using the lagged prices of foods within the same retailer, and
non-food spending, respectively. Panel B uses the average prices faced by households who shop at the same retailer, and non-food spending, respectively.
Panel  C uses the price faced by households if they had shopped in other stores within the same retailer and region, and non-food spending, respectively.
Standard errors, clustered by household, shown in parentheses.
* p < 0.05.
** p < 0.01.
labelling on six different dependent variables that are (to
some extent) under the retailer’s control: the price of foods,
the proportion of foods on promotion, the nutritional qual-
ity (to capture potential reformulation), the pack size, and
the extent to which new products were introduced or old
products were discontinued.
We find that the introduction of labelling coincided
with an improvement in the nutritional quality of foods,
suggesting that the introduction of labelling caused some
retailers to reformulate products. Furthermore, our results
suggest that retailers brought forward the time to dis-
continue some products to take place before labelling
introduction. In addition to these findings being interest-
ing in their own right, they suggest that our household
analysis is picking up not only the effect of labelling on
household demand, but potentially also any effects of
retailers’ decisions, in particular in terms of product refor-
mulation and the discontinuation of products. Having said
that, any reformulation by retailers is unlikely to fully
explain the improvement in the quality of households’
shopping baskets. Indeed, the retailer-analysis suggests
that reformulation improved the nutritional quality of
store-brand labelled as well as unlabelled foods, indicating
that retailers’ reformulation affected all store-brand prod-
ucts, rather than being restricted to store-brand labelled
foods only.7.2. Instrumenting prices and expenditures
Our main models instrument household-level prices
using prices faced by households if they had shopped
in other stores within the same retailer. In Table 5, we
examine the robustness of our results to different sets of
instruments. Panel A specifies lagged prices of food cate-
gory i in retailer r as instruments for current prices; Panel
B uses the average price faced by other households who
shopped at the same retailer; and Panel C uses the price
faced by households if they had shopped in other stores
within the same retailer and region.  The different instru-
ment sets aim to specify different ‘counterfactual prices’
that the household would have faced if they faced dif-
ferent markets in either space or time, excluding their
own  actual choices. The results support our main find-
ings above: labelling led to a 7.3–11.4% reduction in the
quantity of labelled store-brand foods (column 2), which
coincided with an improvement in their nutritional com-
position (column 6). Similarly, we find an improvement in
the healthiness of store-brand cakes, but a reduction in the
healthiness of branded ones (column 8).7.3. Timing of effects
Next, we explore the timing of the labelling effects
to shed more light on when households changed their
E. Fichera and S. von Hinke / Journal of Health Economics 72 (2020) 102326 11
































rom  spell fixed effects regressions that control for year and month dum
rices  and expenditures. The dependent variable is ln(quantity). Prices an
hopped in other stores within the same retailer, and non-food spending
ehaviour and whether this was a persistent or tempo-
ary change. We do this by re-estimating Eq. (2), where
e separate the terms Labellinght × SBhi,j and Labellinght
nto two-month bins for the pre- as well as post-labelling
eriod. This allows the labelling effects to evolve flexibly
ver time.24
Fig. 1 plots the coefficients of the interaction terms for
he different periods pre- and post-labelling introduction
or store-brand labelled foods. This shows no strong dif-
erential trends between treated and control households
rior to the introduction of labelling, suggesting that the
ommon trend assumption holds. Furthermore, we see an
lmost immediate response to the introduction of labelling,
educing the quantity of store-brand labelled foods. The
eduction is visible for the full observation window, but
ith relatively large standard errors when splitting the
ata up in two-month bins, especially for periods further
way from the date of introduction, the individual two-
onth bins are generally not significantly different from
ero.
It is possible that, as labelling was introduced, older
tocks (without labelling) remained on the shelves for a
eriod of time. Although this is less likely to be an issue
or labelled products, as these are mainly perishable, we
xplore the sensitivity of our analyses by dropping the first
onth after introduction of the labelling scheme for each
etailer. The findings, shown in Table B.3, are very similar
24 Another advantage of this specification is that it allows us to explore
he common trend assumption underlying the triple difference approach.
ndeed, the DDD assumes that the trend for treated households is similar
o  the trend for control households prior to the policy introduction.me trends, retailer-specific time trends, and household-level covariates,
ditures are instrumented using the prices faced by households if they had
ively.
to those above, suggesting this does not affect our overall
conclusions.
7.4. Spillover effects
One of the assumptions in our empirical specification is
that there are no “spillover”, or “compositional” effects. In
other words, introducing labelling in retailer r should not
affect households that shop at other retailers. This assump-
tion would be violated if the introduction of labelling leads
to households switching between retailers. We  explore this
using a DD model, regressing a count of the number of
retailers visited by each household in each year-month on
the dummies indicating the date of labelling introduction
for each of the retailers, household-level characteristics, a
time trend, and year, month, and household fixed effects.
Given the nature of the dependent variable, we estimate
this using a Poisson model. Seeing a significant effect of
labelling introduction on the number of retailers visited
might suggest households change their shopping patterns
in response to labelling. The estimates, shown in Table
B.4 in Appendix B, show no significant effects of labelling
introduction on the number of shopping trips, mitigating
concerns over selection into treatment.
7.5. Empirical specification and sample
We  next report a set of sensitivity analyses with regards
to the empirical specification and sample selection. First,
we estimate our models of interest using household and
retailer fixed effects rather than spell fixed effects. As we
show in Table B.5 in Appendix B, the results are qualita-
tively similar to our main models. Second, we re-estimate
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Table 6
Triple-difference models with heterogeneity in effect sizes by socio-demographic characteristics.
ln(Quantity) Nutritional quality

















0.024** −0.108** 0.036** 0.127** −0.353** −0.474** −0.156* −0.416*
(0.004) (0.020) (0.006) (0.021) (0.074) (0.150) (0.065) (0.202)
Labelling, branded −0.023** 0.045** −0.030** −0.100** 0.102 0.283* −0.027 0.416*




−0.013** 0.054** −0.017** −0.148** 0.303** 0.230 0.356** −0.477**
(0.003) (0.016) (0.005) (0.017) (0.060) (0.121) (0.053) (0.163)
Labelling, branded,
high SES
0.012** −0.040* 0.022** 0.070** −0.096 −0.225 −0.130* 0.114
(0.003) (0.016) (0.005) (0.017) (0.058) (0.118) (0.051) (0.159)
High  SES 0.005 0.020 0.015* −0.021 −0.008 0.188 −0.008 −0.223
(0.004) (0.020) (0.006) (0.021) (0.074) (0.151) (0.066) (0.203)
Store-brand −0.251 −1.535 0.026 −0.120 −12.201** −6.750 −16.827** 2.076
(0.147) (0.810) (0.244) (0.861) (3.034) (6.152) (2.679) (8.283)
Panel  B: Gender
Labelling,
store-brand
0.028** −0.083** 0.019** 0.132** −0.052 −0.354* 0.165** −0.626**
(0.003) (0.019) (0.006) (0.020) (0.072) (0.146) (0.063) (0.196)
Labelling, branded −0.019** 0.030 −0.008 −0.121** 0.013 0.102 −0.161** 0.594**




−0.018** 0.023 0.004 −0.156** −0.077 0.081 −0.050 −0.217
(0.003) (0.015) (0.005) (0.016) (0.057) (0.115) (0.050) (0.155)
Labelling, branded,
female
0.008** −0.021 −0.005 0.098** 0.015 0.005 0.038 −0.113
(0.003) (0.015) (0.005) (0.016) (0.057) (0.116) (0.050) (0.156)
Female  −0.004 −0.005 −0.009 −0.001 −0.009 0.062 0.068 −0.511*
(0.004) (0.025) (0.007) (0.026) (0.093) (0.188) (0.082) (0.253)
Store-brand −0.232 −1.567 0.025 0.057 −12.184** −6.865 −16.846** 2.372
(0.147) (0.809) (0.244) (0.861) (3.036) (6.154) (2.680) (8.284)
Panel  C: Children
Labelling,
store-brand
0.019** −0.118** 0.025** 0.047** −0.247** −0.175 −0.057 −0.733**
(0.003) (0.016) (0.005) (0.017) (0.059) (0.120) (0.052) (0.161)
Labelling, branded −0.016** 0.043** −0.013** −0.067** 0.091 0.010 −0.057 0.483**




−0.016** 0.174** −0.007 −0.120** 0.437** −0.373** 0.594** −0.201
(0.003) (0.015) (0.005) (0.016) (0.056) (0.114) (0.050) (0.154)
Labelling, branded,
with children
0.007** −0.093** 0.001 0.072** −0.208** 0.319** −0.229** 0.075
(0.003) (0.014) (0.004) (0.015) (0.054) (0.109) (0.047) (0.147)
With  children 0.003 −0.015 −0.003 0.033* 0.003 −0.052 −0.040 0.140
(0.003) (0.015) (0.004) (0.016) (0.055) (0.112) (0.049) (0.150)
Store-brand −0.198 −2.081* 0.049 0.280 −13.607** −5.623 −18.723** 2.788
(0.147) (0.810) (0.244) (0.862) (3.041) (6.161) (2.683) (8.294)
No.  of observations 360,921 360,921 360,921 360,921 360,921 360,921 360,921 360,921
Notes: The outcome variables include the (natural) logarithm of quantity (in kg; columns 1–4) and the nutrient profile score (columns 5–8). We provide
estimates for the total food basket (columns 1 and 5), as well as for each of the three food groups (columns 2–4 and 6–8). The table shows the estimates from
the  triple difference specification in Eq. (2), but allow the parameters of interest to differ by socio-demographic characteristics. All specifications control
for  household-level covariates, time trends, retailer-specific time trends, year and month dummies, and spell fixed effects. All models instrument for prices
and  expenditure using the prices faced by households if they had shopped in other stores within the same retailer, and non-food spending, respectively.
Standard errors, clustered by household, shown in parentheses.
* p < 0.05.
** p < 0.01.our models on all retailers observed in the data (i.e. includ-
ing smaller retailers, deli’s, etc. in addition to the ‘big 9’, but
not Sainsbury’s for reasons discussed above). Our resultsare robust to the inclusion of more retailers, as shown in
Table B.6. Third, we re-estimate our main models, where
we exclude household-months in which the household did
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Table  7
Triple-difference models with heterogeneity in effect sizes by type of labelling system.
ln(Quantity) Nutritional quality














TLS store-brand 0.003 0.014 0.009 −0.130** −0.145 −0.416 −0.015 0.044
(0.006) (0.034) (0.010) (0.036) (0.126) (0.255) (0.111) (0.343)
Hybrid  store-brand 0.017** −0.083** 0.026** 0.048** −0.104 −0.261* 0.167** −1.022**
(0.003) (0.017) (0.005) (0.018) (0.063) (0.129) (0.056) (0.173)
TLS  branded 0.008 0.028 0.000 0.096** 0.036 0.085 0.074 −0.346
(0.005) (0.025) (0.008) (0.027) (0.095) (0.193) (0.084) (0.260)
Hybrid  branded −0.020** 0.008 −0.016** −0.085** 0.022 0.113 −0.191** 0.754**
(0.002) (0.014) (0.004) (0.014) (0.051) (0.102) (0.045) (0.138)
Store-brand −0.398* −0.502 −0.158 −1.982* −12.699** −8.454 −18.812** 13.472
(0.164) (0.904) (0.273) (0.960) (3.388) (6.871) (2.990) (9.261)
No.  of observations 360,921 360,921 360,921 360,921 360,921 360,921 360,921 360,921
Notes: The outcome variables include the (natural) logarithm of quantity (in kg; columns 1–4) and the nutrient profile score (columns 5–8). We  provide
estimates for the total food basket (columns 1 and 5), as well as for each of the three food groups (columns 2–4 and 6–8). The table shows the estimates
from  the triple difference specification in Eq. (2), but allow the parameters of interest to differ for the traffic light system (TLS) and the hybrid labelling
system. All specifications control for household-level covariates, time trends, retailer-specific time trends, year and month dummies, and spell fixed effects.


































label were voluntary for retailers, we cannot distinguish
between these different explanations.on-food spending, respectively. Standard errors, clustered by household
* p < 0.05.
** p < 0.01.
ot record any shopping for a period of 14 days (rather than
even days in the analysis above). Our results, reported in
able B.7, are generally robust to this sample.
.6. Heterogeneous effects
We  next investigate potential heterogeneous effects
f labelling by different characteristics of the household.
or this, we re-estimate Eq. (2) interacting the labelling
ummy  with an indicator that equals one for high social
lass household (reported in Panel A of Table 6), for female
ain shoppers (Panel B) and for households with children
Panel C).
The findings can be summarised in two main points.
irst, conditional on our set of covariates and fixed effects,
here are no main effects of being in high social class
ouseholds, being a female shopper, or having children.
ndeed, these groups have shopping baskets of similar
uantity and nutritional value (controlling for household
ize, number of children, etc.). Second, there is substantial
eterogeneity in the response to labelling for the different
ubgroups. For example, while both low and high social
lass households reduce the quantity purchased of store-
rand labelled foods following the introduction of FOP
abels, this reduction is larger for the lower compared to
he higher social classes (column 2 of Panel A). Likewise,
ale shoppers reduce the quantity of labelled store-brand
oods by more than female shoppers, and show a larger
mprovement of its nutritional composition (columns 2 and
, Panel B). Similarly, whilst households without children
educed the quantity of store-brand labelled foods by 11.8%
ollowing the introduction of labelling, households with
hildren increased it by 5.6% (i.e. −11.8 + 17.4; column 2,
anel C). Despite that, the largest improvements in the
utritional composition of these foods is seen for house-
olds with children. However, this is offset by a worsening in parentheses.
in the healthiness of branded foods within the same food
group (column 6, Panel C).
Finally, we  examine potential heterogeneous effects of
labelling by different types of labels. Recall that the four
retailers that adopted labelling introduced two types of
labelling systems (see also Table B.1, Appendix B). In partic-
ular, Waitrose and Co-Op introduced a Traffic Light System
(TLS), whilst Marks & Spencer and Asda introduced a hybrid
system. Table 7 reports the analysis that distinguishes
between the two systems. The estimates suggest that our
results are driven by the hybrid system, with no clear
effects for the introduction of traffic lights. More specifi-
cally, the introduction of hybrid labelling led to a reduction
in the quantity of labelled store-brand foods of 8.3%, and
an improvement in their nutritional quality.25
It is important to note, however, that whilst these
results may  be driven by actual differences in the effec-
tiveness of traffic lights versus hybrid labelling, it may
also be the case that the types of consumers who  shop at
the retailers that introduced a hybrid system (i.e. Marks
& Spencer and Asda) are simply different from those who
shop at retailers that introduced traffic lights (i.e. Wait-
rose and Co-Op). For example, perhaps those who  shop
at Marks & Spencer or Asda have a systematically differ-
ent response to nutritional information provision. So rather
than the results being driven by differential effectiveness
of TLS versus a hybrid system, it may  simply be due to dif-
ferent types of consumers shopping at different retailers.
Since the introduction of labelling as well as the choice of25 Although the estimate for the traffic light system on nutritional qual-
ity  on store-brand foods is larger, so is its standard error and it is not
significantly different from zero.
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8. Conclusion
Food and nutrition labelling has been identified as an
important determinant of food choice, with consumer
research suggesting that some schemes may  help improve
the diet and health of the population (Cowburn and
Stockley, 2005; Lobstein and Davies, 2009). Nevertheless,
there is little evidence of their effectiveness in terms of
actual purchasing decisions and nutritional intake (see e.g.
Grunert and Wills, 2007; UK House of Lords Science and
Technology Select Committee, 2011).
We  study the household response to the introduction
of nutrition labelling on specific store-brand foods follow-
ing recommendation by the UK Food Standards Agency
in 2006. Our main analysis specifies a triple-difference
approach, exploiting the differential timing of the introduc-
tion of labelling by different retailers, whilst distinguishing
between store-brand and branded foods. The analysis
examines changes in the quantity as well as nutritional
quality of households’ diets following the introduction of
labelling.
Our results suggest that labelling led to a reduction in
the quantity purchased of labelled store-brand foods, as
well as an improvement in their nutritional composition.
This suggests that FOP labelling caused households to sub-
stitute between food groups, as well as within food groups,
reducing the quantities of labelled foods whilst improving
their nutritional quality.
How do these results compare with the literature? It is
hard to make a direct comparison with published studies
because they evaluate different labelling interventions and
use different food aggregations. In general, however, they
find small (e.g. Bollinger et al., 2011; Wisdom et al., 2010;
Bleich et al., 2016) or no changes (e.g. Elbel et al., 2009) in
the calorie content of the diet. For example, Bollinger et al.
(2011) find that calorie labelling in Starbucks led to a mod-
est reduction of 14 calories per transaction, and Wisdom
et al. (2010) find a reduction in calories of side-dishes and
drinks bought at a fast-food chain of 61 calories. Similar to
Elbel et al. (2009), we are able to investigate the effects of
labelling on other nutrients, in addition to energy. Further-
more, we study the effects on a nutrient profile score that
summarises the overall ‘healthiness’ of the diet. We  find
that households responded to the introduction of labelling
by reducing the total monthly calories, saturated fats, sug-
ars, and sodium of store-brand labelled foods by 9–14% on
average, relative to the mean.
Our findings also suggest that the introduction of
labelling led to an improvement in the nutritional com-
position of store-brand cakes. Although this may  seem
counter-intuitive, as these remained unlabelled through-
out our observation window, we interpret this as the
introduction of FOP labels inducing households to think
more widely about their dietary choices. Indeed, the intro-
duction of labelling per se may  have increased the salience
of nutritional information, leading to an increase in its use.
As such, the introduction of FOP labelling on some products
may  have incentivised households to also use nutritional
back-of-pack information more frequently when making
their purchasing decisions. Hence, the increased salience
of nutrition information may  have prompted householdsalth Economics 72 (2020) 102326
to reconsider the nutritional composition of their grocery
basket, making them more conscious of its (un)healthiness.
This in turn can lead them to change the nutritional value
of their grocery basket more generally, rather than such
changes being confined to products with newly introduced
FOP labels only. Although this is a speculation, this inter-
pretation is consistent with the psychological literature.
For example, examining the effect of nutritional informa-
tion on psychological factors driving consumer choice of
unhealthy foods, Hassan et al. (2010) find that nutrition
information strengthens consumer self-control with an
actionable target (e.g. reducing consumption of unhealthy
foods). Similarly, Baumeister (2002) finds that the provi-
sion of objective information reinforces self-control and
provides a greater imperative to resist temptation.
We also investigate whether nutrition labels have het-
erogenous effects by socio-demographic characteristics.
Theory and evidence suggest ambiguous effects (Grunert
et al., 2010; Sinclair et al., 2013; Hess and Siegrist, 2012;
Feng and Fox, 2018; Larson et al., 2009; Block et al., 2004).
On the one hand, health capital theory suggests that higher
social classes are better able to process information (e.g.
Grossman, 1972). On the other hand, as their opportunity
cost is higher, they may  choose not to use this informa-
tion. In addition, the lower socio-economic groups may  be
less well-informed about the healthiness of their grocery
basket. As such, the introduction of labels is more likely to
provide ‘new’ information for these groups, compared to
the higher social classes. This in turn may  lead to a stronger
response in terms of dietary choices. Our results confirm
the latter hypothesis, suggesting that the reduction in the
quantity and the improvement in the quality of labelled
store-brand foods is larger for lower social class house-
holds. This is interesting from a health equality perspective.
Indeed, there are concerns that nutrition labelling, amongst
other informational policies, may  widen health inequali-
ties because the higher educated are better able to process
information (Feng and Fox, 2018; Fox and Horowitz, 2013).
We do not find evidence here to support this.
Finally, the reduction in the quantity and the improve-
ment in the quality of store-brand labelled foods appears
to be driven by the hybrid labelling system, with no evi-
dence of any effects of the traffic light system. The latter
is perhaps surprising, as some research suggests that traf-
fic lights are easier to understand, especially as consumers
spend just 4–10 s choosing each product and almost half
of adults have difficulty using simple percentages (see e.g.
National Heart Forum, 2007a; Which, 2006; Department
for Education and Skills, 2003). Indeed, studies have found
that simpler information with categorical labels such as
stars or letter grades leads to better comprehension and
use of information (e.g. Thorne and Egan, 2002; Weil and
McMahon, 2003). However, much of this literature com-
pares traffic lights to GDAs, rather than to a hybrid system
that incorporates the percent contribution into a traffic
light system. Indeed, a review by Hawley et al. (2013) sug-
gests that, if percentages are to be used on a label, they
should be accompanied by text (e.g. ‘high’, ‘medium’, or
‘low’) to help with interpretation. As such, hybrid labels
may  be seen as providing more ‘personalised informa-
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Loewenstein et al., 2014). Similarly, as the responsiveness
o nutrition labels varies across socio-demographic char-
cteristics (see e.g. Sanjari et al., 2017), another argument
s that hybrid labelling combines information from the two
ystems. If different consumers respond to different pieces
f information, it may  be that the hybrid system – due to it
eing a combination of two pieces of information – appeals
o a larger group of consumers.
Note, however, that whilst our findings that distinguish
etween label type may  be driven by actual differences in
he effectiveness of traffic lights versus hybrid labelling,
t may  also be the case that the types of consumers that
hop at the retailers that decided to introduce traffic lights
re simply different from those that shop at retailers that
ecided to introduce a hybrid system. Since the introduc-
ion of labelling and the choice of label were voluntary, we
annot distinguish between these different explanations.
There are several limitations of this research. First,
lthough the data are the most highly disaggregated data
vailable on household supermarket purchases, allowing
s to explore the effect of labelling on actual purchases
as opposed to under experimental conditions), it is known
hat survey fatigue leads to under-reporting of top-up pur-
hases such as bread and milk (Leicester and Oldfield,
009). We  attempt to mitigate any such fatigue-effects by
ocusing on the main shopping trip. However, because of
his, our results may  not be generalised to all purchases,
articularly those ‘on-the-go’ and any additional top-up
roducts.
Second, we note that FOP labelling might have affected
etailer decisions. As our data capture consumer choices,
e are unfortunately limited in the extent to which we
an investigate such retailer behaviour. Nevertheless, our
escriptive analysis explores the effects of labelling on
etailers’ prices, promotions, pack size, reformulation, and
he introduction/withdrawal of food products. The find-
ngs suggest that retailers may  have reformulated foods
nd brought forward the time to discontinue products to
ake place before labelling was introduced. Hence, the find-
ngs discussed above should be interpreted with this in
ind, meaning that, in addition to picking up the effect
f labelling on household demand, they may  partially also
e capturing the effect of retailers’ (anticipatory) deci-
ions. Furthermore, it may  be that, as retailers added labels
o their store-brands, they also changed its packaging.
lthough we find no effect of FOP labels on changes in
ack sizes, there may  have been changes in the presenta-
ion of products that also affect purchasing decisions, but
hich we are not able to capture here. Having said that,
ny reformulation by retailers is unlikely to fully explain
he improvement in the quality of households’ shopping
askets. Indeed, the retailer-analysis suggests that refor-
ulation improved the nutritional quality of store-brand
abelled as well as unlabelled foods, indicating that retail-
rs’ reformulation affected all store-brand products, rather
han being restricted to store-brand labelled foods only.
lthough the retailer analysis shows no significant effect
f labelling on the nutritional quality of store-brand cakes,
he estimate is relatively large. Hence, it is possible that
his mechanism also explains some of the improvement
bserved in the nutritional quality of cake purchases.lth Economics 72 (2020) 102326 15
Finally, the policy of FOP labelling that we  examine here
was introduced at a time of few other food policies.26 There
was one policy, however, that overlaps in its timing with
FOP labelling. In particular, in an effort to reduce excessive
salt consumption, the UK government introduced a cam-
paign in March 2005. This led to the reformulation of foods
by manufacturers to reduce their salt content (Griffith et al.,
2016a). However, it is unlikely that our results are con-
founded by this campaign. First, if the improvement in
nutritional quality that we find was  driven by the salt
campaign rather than the introduction of FOP labelling,
we would expect to find improvements across all foods,
rather than those restricted to labelled foods only. Further-
more, our results suggest reductions in nutrients other than
salt, including calories, fats and sugars, suggesting that the
improvements in dietary quality were driven by a policy
that targeted more than just salt. Second, our results are
specific to store-brand foods, with no significant changes
observed among branded foods, whereas the salt cam-
paign was  not brand-specific. Third, we find no evidence
to suggest that the parallel trend assumption is violated,
indicating no large differences in food purchases up to 12
months prior to the introduction of labelling.
Hence, we believe that this study provides evidence on
the effectiveness of nutrition labelling using a relatively
clean identification strategy on a large longitudinal and
highly disaggregated data source. One question is whether
the analysis is generalisable to today’s environment. This
is difficult to answer; it may  be possible that individuals
now pay more or less attention to nutrition labels than
when they were first introduced, but the effect of this, if
any, may  go either way. Hence, we  cannot assess whether
the age of the data and the policy investigated affects the
generalisability of our findings to today’s nutritional envi-
ronment. Instead, we  encourage future research to explore
this setting in more detail and to investigate whether later
adoptions of nutrition labelling (and potentially their inter-
actions with other policies such as taxes) had similar effects
to those found here.
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